CALIFORNIA – The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced Jan. 13 that former Navy sailor Jinchao Wei, convicted of espionage in August 2025, was sentenced to 200 months in federal prison.

Wei, 25, also known as Patrick Wei, was arrested in August 2023 on espionage charges while arriving for work on the amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Essex at Naval Base San Diego, home of the Pacific Fleet.

A federal grand jury indicted him for selling national defense information to a Chinese intelligence officer for $12,000.

After a five-day trial and one day of deliberation, the jury convicted Wei of six crimes, including conspiracy to commit espionage, espionage, and unlawful export of defense-related technical data under the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations. He was acquitted of one count of naturalization fraud.

“By sharing thousands of documents, operating manuals, and export-controlled information with a Chinese intelligence officer, Petty Officer Wei knowingly betrayed his fellow service members and the American people,” said NCIS Director Omar Lopez.

FBI San Diego Special Agent in Charge Mark Dargis said the sentence concludes a first-of-its-kind espionage case in the district and reflects the severity of Wei’s actions against his country.

Wei recognized the situation as espionage

Evidence at trial showed that as a machinist’s mate, Wei held a U.S. security clearance and had access to sensitive information on the ship’s weapons, propulsion, and desalination systems.

Amphibious assault ships like the Essex, similar to small aircraft carriers, help the U.S. project power. They are the cornerstone of the Navy’s amphibious readiness and expeditionary strike capabilities.

On February 14, 2022, Wei was recruited on social media by a Chinese intelligence officer posing as a naval enthusiast with the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.

Evidence showed that even early in his espionage activities, Wei suspected the officer’s true identity and motives.

On February 22, 2022, Wei told a fellow Navy sailor that he believed he was on the radar of a Chinese intelligence organization. He described his contact as extremely suspicious, interested in naval ship maintenance, and asking him to walk the pier daily to note which ships were docked.

Wei said the person offered him $500. He told his friend he wasn’t a fool and recognized the situation as espionage. His friend suggested that Wei delete the contact.

The next day, ignoring his friend’s advice, Wei switched to a supposedly more secure messaging app and began spying for the intelligence officer.

Wei was paid more than $12,000 over 18 months

Evidence showed that from March 2022 until his August 2023 arrest, Wei sent photos and videos of the Essex. He reported Navy ship locations and described the ship’s defensive weapons at the intelligence officer’s request.

He also reported issues with the Essex and other ships at Naval Base San Diego and beyond.

Wei sent the officer thousands of pages of technical and operational data on Navy surface ships, including the Essex, taken from restricted Navy computer systems.

In return, Wei was paid over $12,000 across 18 months.

In one major theft, Wei sold the officer at least 30 technical and operations manuals on U.S. Navy systems.

The manuals included export control warnings and detailed operations of Essex-class ships. They covered power, steering, weapons, aircraft and deck elevators, and damage control systems.

In total, Wei sold the officer about 60 technical manuals, along with dozens of photos and documents detailing the Navy and his assignments on the Essex. Many manuals prominently displayed export-control warnings on their covers.

Wei used handler-provided computer and phone

During the trial, the government presented evidence from Wei’s phone calls, texts, and audio messages with his Chinese handler.

The messages revealed their communications, topics discussed, secrecy measures, assigned tasks, and Wei’s payments via online transfer.

As their relationship progressed, Wei called his handler “Big Brother Andy.” He followed secrecy measures, including multiple encrypted apps, deleting messages and accounts, using 72-hour digital dead drops, and using a handler-provided computer and phone.

The government told the jury that Wei knew his actions were illegal.

Wei had recent Navy training on detecting foreign recruitment. He tried to hide his actions and researched a prior U.S. Navy espionage case, including a DOJ press release.

The evidence showed Wei’s growing willingness to gather sensitive information and his handler’s use of tradecraft to cultivate him as a spy and hide their activities from U.S. authorities.

Espionage has never been charged in this district

In a post-arrest interview, Wei admitted providing the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical manuals and export-controlled data on U.S. Navy ships in exchange for money.

He also admitted he knew his actions were wrong and tried to conceal them.

When asked how he would describe his activities, Wei responded, “espionage.”

Espionage under U.S. Code Section 794 has never been charged in this district. 

The law targets the most serious cases involving the transfer of national defense information that could harm the U.S. or benefit a foreign power.

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